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THE BLACK BOOK OF POLISH CENSORSHIP. Translated and edited by 
Jane Leftwich Curry. New York: Random House. 1984. Pp. xii, 451. 
Cloth, $24.95; paper, $8.95. 
Eight thousand Polish army officers were massacred by the Soviet 
army in the Katyn forest in 1940. When the Germans occupied the 
area the following year, they found mass graves and brought the event 
to the attention of the international media. However, during the 1950's 
and 1960's, the Polish government's desire to encourage positive feel-
ings toward the Soviet Union mandated a policy of silence on the mas-
sacre. On January 14, 1975, the Main Office for Control of Press, 
Publications and Public Performances (GUKPPiW) issued an Inform-
ative Note instructing its censors that future reports of the Katyn mas-
sacre should be censored to bring them within the basic outline of that 
event as presented in the Great Soviet Encyclopedia and the communi-
que of the special commission created by the Soviet authorities in 
1943. The Polish people were to be told that the event transpired as 
follows: 
The Polish officers interned by the Red Army in September 1939 in 
camps in the Smolensk area fell into the hands of the Germans, who 
took over this area in August 1941. These officers were shot by the Na-
zis in the autumn of 1941 and were buried in mass graves in the Katyn 
forest. 
At the beginning of 1943, in connection with the deterioration of 
Germany's military situation and the rising military power of the Soviet 
Union and the progressive consolidation of the anti-German coalition, 
the Nazis decided to try to stir things up, and ascribed their own crimes 
to agencies of the Soviet leadership. [P. 341.] 
After receiving a regulation preventing the publication of the names of 
the officers massacred, Tomasz Strzyzewski, censor no. C-36 of the 
Krakow GUKPPiW, whose grandfather was among those assassi-
nated at Katyn, decided to defect from Poland. In February 1977, 
Strzyzewski arrived in Sweden with 700 pages of classified censors' 
documents strapped to his back and legs and stuffed in his pockets. 
His defection and the publication of Curry's translated excerpts has 
enabled Strzyzewski to realize his goal of letting the world know how 
the Polish government under Edward Gierek was distorting the truth 
(p. 3). 
The documents that Strzyzewski smuggled out were issued from 
1974 through 1977. They afford a picture of Polish life during the 
middle phase of the Gierek government, and thereby enable one to 
understand the forces that led to the toppling of that government and 
the growth of the Solidarity movement. Despite the seven-year delay 
in publication of the documents in English, "minor, though irritat-
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ing"1 inaccuracies by Curry, and her at ti.m.es superficial analysis, the 
work makes a unique contribution. First, it enables the reader to ex-
amine the massive efforts made by a Communist country to control 
the information received by its citizens concerning virtually every as-
pect of their existence. Second, it opens the door to further investiga-
tion of how the Poles were able to circumvent the censorship 
apparatus and obtain information. An examination of the inability of 
the Polish government to keep information from its citizens could lead 
to fruitful discoveries about informal methods of information disper-
sal. In addition, a study of the impact of Western efforts to inform the 
citizenry of Soviet bloc nations through propaganda efforts such as 
Radio Free Europe could illuminate some of the reasons for the inef-
fectiveness of the Polish censorship system. 
Clearly, Curry's expertise in the area of e:ensorship2 enables her to 
evaluate the system set up in Poland. Curry provides a general over-
view of the workings of the censorship bureaucracy and then presents 
selected documents expounding censorship decisions in a number of 
different areas, namely, Polish politics, world politics, social problems, 
economics, religion, history, and culture. 
In the introductory chapters of the book, Curry places the Gierek 
period and Polish censorship within their historical context. While it 
is essential that she do so, she also introduces some misleading con-
cepts. For example, Curry paints an all too idealistic picture of jour-
nalists who, she asserts, "developed a whole unspoken code to 
communicate to their audiences ici,eas that they had no hope of expres-
sing directly" (p. 9). Professor Stanislaw Baranczak points out, how-
ever, "that in a typical Communist country every honest journalist has 
at least a dozen colleagues whose sycophantic articles need no censor-
ing whatsoever."3 Curry's consistent portrayal of the journalists as 
the heroes of the censorship saga colors the work, but does not detract 
greatly from its value once the reader becomes aware of it. 
Curry carefully describes the structure of the censorship bureau-
cracy. The directors of the GUKPPiW, along with their superiors in 
the Polish United Workers' Party Press Department, established stan-
dards for what could and could not be published in different journals. 
They sent reports and directives to the censors instructing them on 
what had to be eliminated from different journals depending on the 
1. In an earlier review of this book, Prof. Stanislaw Baranczak mentions a number of inaccu-
racies in Curry's work. See Baranczak, Big Brother's Red Pencil: The Black Book of Polish 
Censorship, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 2, 1984, at 3_3, 34. 
2. Curry's translation was sponsored by The Rand Corporation. As well as serving as a Rand 
consultant, Curry is a professor at Manhattanville College. Her doctorate is in political science 
and she has previously edited PRESS CoNTROL AROUND THE WORLD (J. Curry & J. Dassin eds. 
1982), DISSENT IN EASIBRN EUROPE (1983), and POLISH DISSIDENT WRITING: AN ANNO-
TATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (1983). . . 
3. Baranczak, supra note 1, at 34. 
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purpose and readership of the journal (pp. 25-26). According to 
Curry, the Polish and other Eastern European governments "invested 
in diverse media with something targeted for almost every interest 
group and some kinds of information deliberately given to some but 
not others" (p. 26). Variation was built into the media, and censorship 
was designed to be inconsistent. Curry states the rule of thumb as 
follows: "the smaller the audience, the larger the margin for criti-
cism" (p. 34). This rule "allows sociopolitical weeklies more leeway 
than dailies and tiny-circulation scholarly journals even more room" 
(p. 34). Curry describes the process through which powerful journal-
ists and editors could appeal decisions to censor their work. Officially, 
the first appeal was to the Press Department. If necessary, one could 
also argue to a Politburo member. In practice, the interconnections 
between the media establishment and party authorities resulted in a 
far less formal process (p. 37). 
The problems faced by censors may have been most severe in edit-
ing information concerning world politics. While it was imperative 
that the political leadership learn about international events, "the for-
eign affairs materials confronted the censors with a world whose 
events seldom proved Marxist theory right" (p. 109). Curry claims 
that far more information on events and conditions elsewhere was 
available in Poland than in other Soviet bloc countries through foreign 
journals, Western wire-service reports, and West-sponsored Polish-
language radio broadcasts such as Radio Free Europe (p. 110). While 
the availability of such information clearly presented a problem for 
Polish censors, Curry's characterization of them as the most severe in 
Eastern Europe is questionable. In the German Democratic Republic, 
the vast majority of people can receive television and radio broadcasts 
from the Federal Republic of Germany or from West Berlin. In addi-
tion to the ease with which Western broadcasts are received in East 
Germany, the fact that West Germans and other Westerners can enter 
East Berlin freely on day visas makes the control of Western informa-
tion in East Germany a very complex problem. Further, the East 
Germans are not only receiving the information in their native lan-
guage, but also from their own countrymen. They are continually 
confronted with the fact that their country is divided. The legitimiza-
tion problems that the East German government faces are, therefore, 
even more severe than those facing the Polish regime. 
The problems of differentiating between the two Germanies and 
legitimizing the East German government can be seen in Polish cen-
sorship directives. Elaborate detail was provided the censors to ensure 
that the correct political stance toward the division was always taken. 
The following regulations governed terminology: 
3. Given the existence of two German states, the following rules of no-
menclature are to be binding for all publications. 
a. There should be strict adherence to the proper nomenclature for 
February 1985] Foreign, International and Comparative Law 1043 
the Zgorzelec Pact of July 6, 1950, the official name of which is: "The 
Pact Between the Polish Republic and the German Democratic Republic 
Concerning the Established, Existing Polish-German National Border"; 
b. The terms given below may be used to designate our W estem 
border: 
the border on the Oder and the Neisse 
- the border between Poland and the GDR 
- the Polish-GDR border, but this term should not be used: Po-
lish-German border; 
c. Proper nomenclature for institutions, organizations, sports un-
ions and so on of the German Democratic Republic and the Federal 
Republic of Germany should be observed, and the adjective "German" 
should not be used but should be replaced by the more precise terms 
"GDR" and "FRG," or "East German" and "West German," 
respectively; 
d. The term "German" should not be used to refer (in the context 
of the present day) to the territory or state of the GDR, FRG or West 
Berlin; 
e. In mentioning the capital of the GDR, the term "Berlin" should 
be used, to differentiate it from "West Berlin." (See Informative Note 
No. 43/73) [Pp. 126-27.] 
Censors were required to assure that the image presented of other 
Eastern bloc countries was positive. Information concerning the So-
viet Union was very closely monitored. The second permanent regula-
tion for censors dealing with foreign affairs stated: 
Any information on diplomatic steps or initiatives by countries of the 
socialist community (especially Poland and the Soviet Union) may ap-
pear only after appropriate official communiques have been issued by 
PAP or TASS, and simultaneously with them. In no case may the pub-
lisher's own information precede the official news or conflict with its 
content. [P. 116.] 
Information about economic problems in the Soviet Union was 
blocked (p. 119). Mentions of Stalinist repression were unprintable (p. 
121). 
In censoring Western news, a balance had to be struck between the 
desire not to alienate Western leaders from whom Poland hoped to 
receive trade concessions, and the fear of presenting too rosy a picture 
of life in the non-Communist world (pp. 130-31 ). The treatment of an 
interview on the future of parliamentarism in France demonstrates the 
way in which censors were taught to present the West. The following 
excerpt was barred from publication because of the italicized passages: 
"I see a fairly bright future for parliamentarism in France. It is more 
promising under Giscard than under de Gaulle, who most assuredly dis-
liked parliament and regarded it as a necessary evil." "What about the 
Union of the Left in France?" "I do not have much faith in its reputa-
tion. Besides, in France the Communists are a normal political party -
in the towns and departments which they control, they are not carrying 
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out any reforms, but are simply performing administrative duties - they 
are doing a good job of administration. The same thing is going on in 
Italy .... "4 
The document, as censored, presented a very different view of French 
government than the author intended. 
Curry discusses the attempts to keep media coverage of domestic 
problems to a minimum in the chapters on social problems, econom-
ics, and culture. One of the most striking examples she presents is the 
censorship of information concerning health problems. The Ministry 
of Health and Social Welfare risked exacerbating epidemics by not 
warning people of the dangers or suggesting precautions that could be 
taken. The following information could appear only upon the ap-
proval of the Ministry: 
1) mass poisonings and illness (regardless of cause) affecting large 
groups of the population or enterprises of particular importance to our 
country; 
2) mass food poisoning in cafeterias of places of employment, vacation 
centers, summer camps and so on (including poisoning resulting from 
the consumption of food contaminated by pesticides); 
3) occurrences of particular serious diseases (such as smallpox, cholera, 
etc.); 
4) occurrences of epidemics of contagious diseases in this country, in-
cluding influenza; and 
5) concrete threats of epidemic diseases being introduced into this coun-
try . . . . [P. 211.] 
The Polish government's desire to substantiate the validity of 
Marxist-Leninist doctrine becomes evident when one examines the di-
rectives on censorship of articles concerning religion and history. 
Although Curry discusses briefly the role of Judaism in Polish culture 
and history (p. 280), she fails to foc:us adequately on the growing anti-
semitism in Poland and to evaluate whether the government was, in 
fact, attempting to further anti-Jewish feeling as an escape valve for 
the frustrations arising out of the worsening economic situation. The 
reader is left wondering whether the Jews are again being made the 
scapegoat for Polish problems. 
Curry does a more satisfying job of discussing the directives given 
to the censors who handle Catholic publications. These censors were 
instructed to prevent religion and the Church from appearing to be as 
important or more important than Marxism-Leninism (p. 283). 
Church publications were to be carefully scrutinized, and publication 
of the most basic materials, such as affirmations of loyalty and cards 
notifying parish priests that parishioners were ill, was often inter-
rupted (p. 289). Along with downplaying current activities of the 
Church, efforts were made to minimize the significance of the Church 
4. P. 138 (emphasis in original). 
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throughout Polish history. References to the influence of religion on 
Polish national heroes were deleted (p. 297). 
In addition to deemphasizing the role of the Church, censors tried 
to erase from historical accounts embarrassing personalities and trends 
that did not conform with the Communist view of history (p. 318). 
For example, censors were instructed to color accounts of leftist move-
ments during the interwar period, if those accounts made clear that 
the "socialist" movements had actually been right-wing, nationalist 
forces (p. 332). When the history of socialism did not conform to the 
Marxist-Leninist paradigm, that fact had to be covered up. Therefore, 
the battles that were fought between anti-Communist, socialist parties 
and the Communist party during the prewar period became nonhis-
tory, as did mentions of anti-Soviet sentiment among Polish socialists 
(p. 333). 
Despite the great effort it made, the censorship system did not 
achieve its goals, according to Curry. She asserts that despite the cen-
sorship, the Poles were still informed about historical events: 
Ironically, even though the media audience during the seventies was 
drawn increasingly from the postwar baby boom generation, with little 
or no firsthand experience of Poland's prewar or even Stalinist past, cen-
soring history did not erase it for them. Images and events were trans-
ferred verbally from person to person, generation to generation. Instead 
of becoming less significant, historical events grew more symbolic, more 
and more emotionally charged, until in the spiral of events in 1980, when 
the victory of shipyard workers in Gdansk opened the possibilities for 
free discussion of Poland's past, the writing and rethinking of the coun-
try's history became as imperative a goal as programming its future for 
workers and intellectuals alike. [P. 369.] 
The Black Book presents the reader with an overview of Polish 
society during the mid-seventies, but it fails to analyze adequately all 
of the problems it presents. Curry's failure to delve into the historical 
and political events she discusses lessens the book's potential impact. 
While the thoroughness and complexity of the censorship process is 
impressed upon the reader, the effect of that process is not. Because 
the censorship system is alien to the American reader, Curry's presen-
tation of documents makes a valuable contribution to the American 
understanding of present-day Poland. However, she does not exhaust 
the usefulness of the smuggled documents. One hopes that historians 
and other scholars will be able to use them as a resource in examining 
the Gierek era. 
